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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Richard Turner Kerr appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for 
grand theft by possession of stolen property. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Kerr was found driving a reported stolen vehicle and was charged with grand theft 
by possession of stolen property.  (PSI, p. 3; R., pp. 80-81, 84-85.)  He pleaded guilty to 
the grand theft charge pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.  (R., pp. 82-83.) 
 In his presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Kerr told the investigator the 
following: 
During the interview, Mr. Kerr indicated some “random” person that he 
did not know sold him the vehicle. He indicated he was just walking down 
the street and started hanging out with this person. Mr. Kerr admitted he 
knows the individual[’]s name but prefers not to say. 
 
(PSI, p. 4.) 
 
At sentencing, the victim of the theft made a statement, and the state 
recommended a retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p. 8, L. 7 – p. 12, L. 10.)  Kerr’s counsel also 
recommended a rider, and corrected the PSI, noting that while it stated Kerr had five adult 
felony convictions, it should have stated that Kerr had two adult felony convictions 
(including the instant offense).  (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 4-9; p. 14, Ls. 9-21.)  Kerr’s counsel did not 
challenge the remainder of the PSI’s criminal history, which showed 13 adult 
misdemeanor convictions, 2 juvenile felony convictions, 17 juvenile misdemeanor 
convictions, and one adult conviction with unknown severity.  (See Tr., p. 4, Ls. 11-20; 
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PSI, pp. 4-10.)  Kerr’s counsel noted that “I have never seen a client as young as Mr. Kerr 
that has spent as much time in custody as he has.”  (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 14-16.) 
 At the conclusion of sentencing the district court and Kerr had the following 
exchange: 
THE COURT: All right. Here is the sentence that I’m handing down for 
the felony crime theft by receiving, possessing or disposing of stolen 
property for events that occurred June 1st, 2016. The sentence is to the 
custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed five-year 
sentence followed by an indeterminate nine-year sentence, total sentence 
not to exceed fourteen years. 
 
So I’m going to give you one chance and one chance only to be honest, 
and you’ll either tell me who you bought this from or you won’t. If you tell 
me who you bought it from, I will consider a retained jurisdiction. I’m not 
overly thrilled about a retained jurisdiction given your criminal history, but 
I won’t consider a retained jurisdiction unless you’re honest about who 
you got it from. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Honestly I don’t know, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Then you lied in your pre-sentence report where it says on 
Page 4, “Mr. Kerr admitted he knows the individual’s name but prefers not 
to say.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I — 
 
THE COURT: So I am imposing that prison sentence and remanding you 
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction today, and give you 
credit for 182 days time served on that sentence. 
 
(Tr., p. 16, L. 10 – p. 17, L. 10.)  The district court entered a judgment of conviction 
imposing Kerr’s sentence.  (R., pp. 89-91.) 
 Kerr timely appealed.  (R., pp. 93-96.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Kerr states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court’s questioning of Kerr in violation of Kerr’s Fifth 
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination constitute 
fundamental error such that the issue may be addressed on appeal despite 
the lack of a timely objection before the trial court? 
 
II. Did the district court violate Kerr’s Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to 
consider sentencing Kerr to a retained jurisdiction unless Kerr identified 
the person from whom he purchased the stolen vehicle? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Kerr failed to show the district court committed fundamental error by imposing his 
sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Kerr Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Imposing 
His Sentence 
 
A. Introduction 
 Kerr admitted in his PSI that he knew, but did not want to reveal, the name of the 
person he bought the stolen vehicle from.  (PSI, p. 4.)  At sentencing, the district court 
asked Kerr to “tell me who you bought this from”; when Kerr stated “Honestly I don’t 
know,” the court imposed Kerr’s sentence, finding that “you lied in your pre-sentence 
report.”  (Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 10.) 
 Kerr did not object below and therefore must show the district court committed 
fundamental error by imposing Kerr’s sentence as opposed to retaining jurisdiction.  
Because Kerr fails to show that the district court clearly violated his constitutional rights 
by imposing his sentence, and fails to show that any alleged error affected his substantial 
rights, he cannot show fundamental error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review.”  Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014).  However, 
“[i]t is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be 
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).  Idaho’s appellate courts review 
unpreserved claims of error for fundamental error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).  
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C. The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Imposing Kerr’s 
Sentence 
 
 Kerr concedes that because he did not object to his sentence imposition below he 
must therefore show fundamental error on appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3, 5-6.)  In 
order to do so he must show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P.3d at 980.  He cannot do so here. 
1. Kerr Has Failed To Show That, In Light Of His Admission To Knowing An 
Individual Connected To This Offense, That The District Court’s Request For 
That Individual’s Name Would Clearly Violate Kerr’s Unwaived Fifth 
Amendment Rights 
 
A criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination extends to sentencing.  See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) 
(“Any effort by the State to compel [a defendant] to testify against his will at the 
sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.”).  While a guilty 
plea will waive a defendant’s constitutional protections with respect to the “offenses to 
which the defendant pleads guilty,” it is “not to be construed ‘as being a blanket waiver 
with respect to other offenses that might be charged’” at a later time.  State v. Jones, 129 
Idaho 471, 475-76, 926 P.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Ct. App. 1996).  The Idaho Supreme Court 
has therefore held that where a district court “relinquished jurisdiction solely because 
Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right and answer questions that could 
incriminate him and result in new felony charges,” that the court violated the defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment rights.  State v. Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016). 
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 However, this does not mean that sentencing courts are prohibited from drawing 
any adverse inferences whatsoever from a defendant’s silence.  In Mitchell v. United 
States, the United States Supreme Court made two very narrow holdings: the entry of a 
guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privileges at sentencing, and, 
“in determining facts about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence … a 
sentencing court may not draw” an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence. 
526 U.S. 314, 316-17 (1999) (emphasis added).  Applying those principles, the Mitchell 
Court held that “[b]y holding petitioner’s silence against her in determining the facts of 
the offense at the sentencing hearing”—those facts being the amount of the controlled 
substance at issue—“the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise 
of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.”   Id. at 330. 
But Mitchell made it clear that not all adverse inferences based on a defendant’s 
silence at sentencing are prohibited: 
The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime 
at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at 
the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears 
upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of 
responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in 
§ 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate 
question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Mitchell does not stand as a 
bar on all negative inferences based on a defendant’s silence at sentencing.  To the 
contrary, the White v. Woodall Court pointed out that while the privilege against self-
incrimination applies at sentencing, “it is not uncommon for a constitutional rule to apply 
somewhat differently at the penalty phase than it does at the guilt phase.”  134 S.Ct. 1697, 
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1703 (2014).  And indeed, noted the Woodall Court, “Mitchell itself leaves open the 
possibility that some inferences might permissibly be drawn from a defendant’s penalty-
phase silence.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court clarified that the Mitchell holding was framed 
“narrowly, in terms implying that it was limited to inferences pertaining to the facts of the 
crime.”  Id.  The Woodall Court thus concluded that 1) “if Mitchell suggests that some 
actual inferences might be permissible at the penalty phase, it certainly cannot be read to 
require a blanket no-adverse-inference instruction at every penalty-phase trial”; and 2) 
where the defendant pleads guilty to “all of the charges he faced, including the applicable 
aggravating circumstances,” that “any inferences that could have been drawn from 
[defendant’s] silence would arguably fall within the class of inferences as to which 
Mitchell leaves the door open.”  See id. at 1704 (emphasis in original). 
 Here, the district court’s questioning regarding the seller of the vehicle did not 
clearly violate Kerr’s unwaived Fifth Amendment rights.  As a threshold matter, Kerr has 
failed to show that he affirmatively asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  
“Ordinarily, to be afforded the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant must 
affirmatively invoke the privilege.”  State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 777, 391 P.3d 659, 
662 (2017) (citing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 410–11, 87 
L.Ed. 376, 379–80 (1943); State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 112, 952 P.2d 1245, 1248 
(1998)).  A defendant has a “duty to claim the privilege … even when the government is 
unquestionably attempting to compel a response.”  Powell, 161 Idaho at 777, 391 P.3d at 
662 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, 47 L.Ed.2d 
370, 377 (1976)).  The record reflects that Kerr did not invoke his right to silence; rather, 
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he responded to the district court’s question by stating he did not know the answer, a 
statement the district court found to be dishonest.  (See Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 5.) 
Further, Kerr has failed to show that the district court unconstitutionally 
compelled his statement about the car seller’s identity by placing him in a “classic 
penalty” situation.  See Powell, 161 Idaho at 777-78, 391 P.3d at 662-63; Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).  To show a classic penalty, Kerr must establish that the 
court asserted, “either expressly or impliedly, that invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
will lead to a substantial penalty.”  See Powell, 161 Idaho at 778, 391 P.3d at 663.  And 
even if there was such a threat, not all threatened penalties are “sufficiently compelling” 
to constitute a classic penalty.  Id. at 779, 391 P.3d at 664.  For example, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that threatening an already-convicted medium-security 
prisoner with a transfer to maximum security, with a concomitant loss of privileges, wage 
opportunities, and facility access, was not sufficiently compelling to violate his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-48 (2002) (finding “[a] broad range 
of choices that might infringe constitutional rights in a free society fall within the 
expected conditions of confinement of those who have suffered a lawful conviction”); but 
see Powell, 161 Idaho at 780-81, 391 P.3d at 665-66 (finding unlawful compulsion where 
an inmate faced a “threat of denied parole [which] was a sufficiently substantial penalty 
to compel [the defendant] to self-incriminate”).  Here, Kerr contends the district court 
“was unambiguously laying the trap” for him by asking him to reveal the name of the 
seller (Appellant’s brief, p. 8), but he does not establish that considering retained 
jurisdiction unless the name was revealed was a sufficiently compelling penalty.  Like 
McKune, Kerr had already been convicted of the crime, and like McKune’s medium-
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security and maximum-security housing options, Kerr’s options here were prison or the 
“prison-like experience” of a rider.  State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30 P.3d 293, 
298 (2001).  Moreover, the “decision to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation is 
committed to the district judge’s discretion.”  Id.; I.C. § 19-2601.  Because Kerr has failed 
to show that the court not considering a rider rose to the level of a classic penalty 
situation, he has failed to show that any unconstitutional compulsion violated his rights 
here. 
Moreover, Kerr fails to show that the topic he was questioned on would have been 
incriminating, because he fails to show his own right against self-incrimination would 
cover questions about the identity of a third party.  While giving the name of the vehicle 
supplier would obviously incriminate the third party, Kerr fails to show this information 
would be “self-incriminating,” either as to the instant offense or to other crimes. Kerr had 
already pleaded guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property (R., pp. 82-83), and 
knowledge of the name of the vehicle’s prior possessor is not an element of that offense 
(see I.C. § 18-2403(4)).  Kerr does not allege that questions about the third party’s name 
would have constituted improperly “determining facts about” the instant offense, such 
that Mitchell would prohibit them.  See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316-17. 
Kerr instead theorizes that had he supplied the name, Kerr himself could have 
then been charged with a new crime: conspiracy to transfer a stolen vehicle.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 7 (citing I.C. §§ 49-228, 18-1701).)  This appears to draw from the logic in 
Komen, in which the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a district court that “relinquished 
jurisdiction solely because Defendant refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right and 
answer questions that could incriminate him and result in new felony charges.” 
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160 Idaho 534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744.  But this argument fails, because Kerr fails to 
show that merely revealing knowledge of the co-conspirator’s name could result in a new 
charge against him.  A co-conspirator’s name is not an element of a conspiracy charge.  
See I.C. § 18-1701; see also I.C.J.I. 1101 (allowing “another unknown person” as a model 
jury instruction on the element of the co-conspirator’s identity).  Furthermore, Kerr 
himself had already voluntarily placed all potentially relevant facts about the hypothetical 
co-conspirator into the presentence report—he described the individual’s existence, 
Kerr’s interactions with the individual, and ultimate receipt of the car from the individual. 
(PSI, pp. 3-4.)  To the extent those facts could be relevant to a hypothetical conspiracy 
charge, Kerr himself had already adduced them.  This case is therefore distinguishable 
from Komen, insofar as Kerr has failed to show, in light of what he had already 
volunteered, that the additional revelation of the individual’s name would substantiate a 
conspiracy charge against Kerr. 
 Along the same lines, even if Kerr can show that he had a Fifth Amendment right 
not to reveal the name of the third party, he cannot show he did not waive that right.  The 
record reveals that Kerr himself described his interaction with the individual who sold 
him the vehicle, and Kerr volunteered to the presentence investigator that he knew the 
person’s name.  (PSI, p. 4.)  “It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, 
may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination when questioned about the details,” and a “witness himself, certainly if he 
is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry.”  Mitchell, 526 U.S. 
at 321-22 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)).  The Idaho Supreme 
Court has similarly concluded that a witness is not precluded from “testifying voluntarily 
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in matters which may incriminate him,” and that statements voluntarily made are 
“admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”  See Komen, 160 Idaho at 538-39, 
376 P.3d at 742-43 (“Had Defendant submitted to the polygraph examination and made 
incriminating statements, those statements may have been held not to have been 
compelled and therefore admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”).  Having 
opened the door and provided information not only about interacting with the individual, 
but about knowing his name, Kerr cannot claim an unwaived privilege was violated 
simply because the district court asked a follow-up question about a detail—i.e., what 
was the name. 
 Lastly, because Mitchell leaves open the question of whether permissible 
inferences may be drawn from a defendant’s silence at sentencing, the district court here 
did not clearly violate Kerr’s Fifth Amendment rights by basing its decision, in part, on 
an inference about his honesty, and properly imposed his sentence.  The district court’s 
exchange with Kerr, after it imposed sentence but before deciding whether to retain 
jurisdiction, was as follows: 
THE COURT: … So I’m going to give you one chance and one chance 
only to be honest, and you’ll either tell me who you bought this from or 
you won’t. If you tell me who you bought it from, I will consider a 
retained jurisdiction. I’m not overly thrilled about a retained jurisdiction 
given your criminal history, but I won’t consider a retained jurisdiction 
unless you’re honest about who you got it from. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Honestly I don’t know, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: Then you lied in your pre-sentence report where it says on 
Page 4, “Mr. Kerr admitted he knows the individual’s name but prefers not 
to say.” 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I – 
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THE COURT: So I am imposing that prison sentence and remanding you 
to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction today, and give you 
credit for 182 days time served on that sentence. 
 
(Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 10.) 
 Per the court’s own explanation of its ruling, it was concerned from the outset 
about Kerr’s chances on a rider given his criminal history.  And rightly so, because by the 
age of 23 Kerr had accrued some 35 criminal convictions, and Kerr’s own attorney 
conceded he had “never seen a client as young as Mr. Kerr that has spent as much time in 
custody as he has.”  (PSI, pp. 4-10; Tr., p. 13, Ls. 14-16.)  Nevertheless, the district court 
was open to considering a rider, and to giving Kerr a “chance … to be honest” about the 
crime—but it informed him it would not consider a retained jurisdiction if Kerr was not 
honest in responding to the court.  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 18-25.)  Kerr did not provide the name, 
and instead responded that he “honestly” did not know who he bought the vehicle from, 
which is the opposite of what he told the presentence investigator.  (Compare Tr., p. 17, 
Ls. 1-2 with PSI, p. 4.)  The district court therefore reasonably concluded that Kerr lied to 
the presentence investigator, and was not being honest.1  (Tr. p. 17, Ls. 3-5.)   
Like a negative inference justifying a sentencing guideline departure, or a negative 
inference about a defendant’s remorse—neither of which the United States Supreme 
                                            
1 The district court’s finding about Kerr’s honesty was by logical necessity correct: 
because Kerr told the district court he did not know the name of the individual, he was 
necessarily not being truthful when he told the presentence investigator he knew the 
individual’s name.  (Compare Tr., p. 17, Ls. 1-2 with PSI, p. 4.)  Alternatively, if Kerr 
was honest when he told the presentence investigator that he knew the individual’s name, 
then Kerr was necessarily not being truthful to the court when he told the court he 
“honestly” did not know.  Because Kerr’s statements cannot both be true, Kerr was 
invariably either misrepresenting what he knew to the court, or to the court’s presentence 
investigator. 
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Court has held unconstitutional—a negative inference about a defendant’s honesty based 
on his own contradictory statements would be proper.  The district court had preexisting 
concerns about retaining jurisdiction, given Kerr’s criminal history.  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 22-
25.)  And because the district court premised considering a rider on Kerr’s honesty, and 
Kerr’s own admissions mean that he was necessarily dishonest with either the court or its 
investigator, the district court was within its discretion to draw a negative inference about 
Kerr’s honesty, and deny him the benefit of a retained jurisdiction. 
 Kerr is therefore unable to show, in any event, a clear violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right, and accordingly fails to show the first prong of the fundamental error 
test. 
2. Kerr Has Failed To Show That The Alleged Error Was Not Harmless 
 
 Even if Kerr has shown that there was a clear violation of an unwaived 
constitutional right, he cannot show that such a violation was not harmless.  In order to 
meet the third prong of the fundamental error analysis, “the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that 
it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 
P.3d at 978.  Kerr has failed to demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings.   
Kerr argues that “the record does not indicate” the district court used the 
information before it—including the PSI, the victim’s statement, the statements of 
counsel and Kerr, and Kerr’s criminal history—“in fashioning Kerr’s sentence.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  Rather, Kerr contends that the court’s statements to Kerr 
“constituted a promise by the district court that it would impose Kerr’s prison sentence, 
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without the opportunity for a retained jurisdiction, if Kerr failed to reveal the identity of 
the person from whom he purchased the stolen vehicle.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  Kerr 
contends that when he did not provide the name the court “kept its promise and imposed 
Kerr’s sentence,” and that “little doubt exists that the district court’s error affected the 
outcome of Kerr’s sentencing.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
The problem with this analysis is it ignores the district court’s statements that 
indicated it did consider Kerr’s history, and as a result of that history, the district court 
was not “thrilled” about retaining jurisdiction from the start.  (See Tr., p. 16, Ls. 18-25.)  
Moreover, the district court never indicated that it would retain jurisdiction if Kerr 
revealed the individual’s identity; instead, the court simply stated that if Kerr revealed the 
name it would consider a rider, and if he did not, the court would not.  (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 20-
25.)  In other words, the district court never indicated that but for Kerr’s statements he 
would have received a retained jurisdiction.  And Kerr has not shown that if he had given 
the name the court would have retained jurisdiction.  As a result, Kerr has failed to show 
that the district court’s alleged error affected his substantial rights, because he has not 
shown that but for the claimed error, he would have been placed on a rider. 
Because Kerr has not shown a clear violation of a constitutional right, nor that 
such a violation affected his substantial rights, he fails to show the district court 
committed fundamental error in retaining jurisdiction. 
--
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Kerr’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence. 
 DATED this 1st day of September, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans____________ 
      KALE D. GANS 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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